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State Secrecy: A Literature Review
Stéphane Lefebvre1
Abstract
What is secrecy? What is a state secret? Which state secrets deserve
protection from disclosures? How are state secrets protected from
disclosure? In this review, I use these questions as an organizing framework
to review the richness of a very disparate, largely US-centric, but also
multidisciplinary literature. In doing so, I highlight the social nature of
secrecy - that it is a social construct with social effects and consequences and the need for further research to unveil those rationalities that specific
discourses on state secrecy put forward to legitimize the nondisclosure of
state secrets.
Keywords
disclosure, government secrecy, literature review, secrecy, state secrets

The world has no shortage of openly available data to expand its
knowledge. While it was once very difficult to know what was happening in
remote and shielded areas of the world, social media, commercial data
mining and commercial satellite imagery, among others, have opened up
1
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new vistas of knowledge.1 Compounded by massive leaks of state secrets by
Manning and Snowden in the 2010s, this new access to data and knowledge
has raised a fundamental question about the ability of state officials and
political leaders to keep their activities away from prying eyes: Is nothing
secret?2 Of course, the question is facetious. States worldwide still have
plenty of secrets to protect from unauthorized disclosure.
In fact, leakers and spies are vigorously pursued everywhere, and the
United States is no exception. State officials who disclose without
authorization secrets they are entrusted with, especially to an agent of
another state, commit a serious crime against their own state. In modern
democracies, such acts are at least considered political offences or at worst
treason, and can be severely punished. In comparison with most other
crimes, however, the unauthorized disclosure of state secrets and its
prosecution in advanced democracies are relatively rare events.
Since 9/11, US scholars have paid particular attention to state secrets
and raised concerns about many issues. Most importantly, they have
questioned the superabundance of state secrets, the ability of oversight and
review bodies to regulate any abuse of secrecy, and the effects and
transparency costs of secrecy.
For example, in Democracy in the Dark/The Seduction of Government
Secrecy, legal counsel Frederick A. O. Schwarz, Jr. argues that the United
States has entered a “Secrecy Era” characterized by a superabundance of
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state secrets designed not to protect America but to keep what is
reprehensible from Americans, and an entrenched and seductive security
culture within the walls of the American government. His antidote to secrecy,
necessary to buttress democracy, is openness. 3 Schwarz’s views accord well
with those who believe that governments should be more transparent and
that there should be fewer state secrets than there are. In Secrecy in the
Sunshine Era, political scientist Jason Ross Arnold in turn observes that
executive secrecy is as pervasive in Democratic as Republican
administrations, predates 9/11, and resists the sunshine era that freedom of
information laws were supposed to usher. 4
In Secrets and Leaks: The Dilemma of State Secrecy, professor of
politics Rahul Sagar argues that the contemporary debate surrounding state
secrecy in the United States is not about its legitimacy but instead about
whether or not there is a proper regulatory framework in place to ensure
that it will not be abused. Devising such a framework, he contends, is very
difficult to do.5 Hence, to avoid regulatory capture inherent in any single
authority, he further argues that the possibility of unauthorized disclosures
of state secrets “provides the most effective and credible guarantee that
those who have the formal authority over state secrecy cannot
systematically use it to their own advantage,”6 even though leaks of state
secrets can be done both for good and for ill. 7 In When Should State Secrets
Stay Secret? political scientist Genevieve Lester argues that US intelligence
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accountability and oversight mechanisms (which largely operate in secret so
as not to endanger national security) contribute to greater secrecy instead of
expanding public access to intelligence information. 8 Her analysis of these
mechanisms shows that they have for effect to reinforce state secrecy.
Finally, in Democracy Declassified: The Secrecy Dilemma in National
Security, political scientist Michael Colaresi examines the negative effects
and transparency costs of secrecy in foreign policy, and argues, using
counterfactual examples, that an excess of authorized disclosures of foreign
policy secrets “is likely to undercut the public benefit of the [foreign] policy”
under discussion.9 Importantly, he acknowledges that keeping secrets may
sometimes delegitimize a particular foreign policy, but be that as it may,
what remains important is for the state to have significant justifications. 10 To
bridge the gap in accountability created by the existence of state secrets, he
argues that combined solutions such as transparency cost deflation (secrets
lose their value over time thus allowing ex-post accountability) and the
empowerment of oversight and accountability mechanisms external to the
executive branch of government can increase the probability of public
consent to the state’s foreign policy choices.
What these authors tell us is that state secrets are ubiquitous, well
entrenched, and sometimes necessary for the conduct of state activities and
therefore here to stay. The best that can be hoped is for states to devise and
implement adequate and efficient oversight and review bodies to avoid
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abuses and minimize the costs of secrecy to the state and society. Yet, do
we really have a good grasp of what secrecy is, what a state secret is, of
which state secrets are deserving of protection from disclosures, and of how
state secrets are protected from disclosure? In this article, I use these
questions as an organizing framework to overview the richness of a very
disparate, largely US-centric, but also multidisciplinary literature. This
literature overview thus looks at how a variety of scholars have answered
these questions. In doing so, it highlights the social nature of secrecy (that it
is a social construct with social effects and consequences) and the need for
further research to unveil those rationalities that specific discourses on state
secrecy put forward to legitimize the nondisclosure of state secrets. Its
particular contribution to the literature on state secrecy is in showing that
our understanding of the subject can be enriched through a wider,
multidisciplinary approach.
Overview
Social scientists have consistently neglected the study of secrecy in
complex and large organizations and instead paid a significant amount of
attention to the study of non-state secrecy in small organizations, such as
secret societies and religious sects. 11 The renewed interest in secrecy and
esotericism shown by academics, novelists and popular entertainers in the
1990s only compounded that situation, since it did not lead to a better
understanding of the overall subject. In Urban’s assessment, “the study of
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secrecy has remained disappointingly general, universalistic, and largely
divorced from social and historical context.”12 Social scientists, especially,
have spent little time theorizing about the “origins, nature, workings, and
consequences of secrecy within social systems.” 13
Balmer’s assertion that “[s]ecrecy has never been a major topic of
research in social science, although it has not been entirely neglected,” is
indeed correct.14 That said, it should be noted that a distinct field of studies
centered on secrecy is being developed and supported by a university-based,
peer-reviewed, and interdisciplinary journal entitled Secrecy and Society.15
With its first issue published in 2016, the journal aims at exploring secrecy in
its various manifestations and through a variety of theoretical and cultural
underpinnings.16 In doing so, it is building a scholarly community on the
subject of secrecy, making a legitimate and major topic of research.
Where the study of secrecy has particularly not been neglected, of
course, is in its breach. As Erickson and Flynn noted, “[s]ecrecy is […] likely
to be examined in terms of a deviant form of organizational behaviour; it is
the illegal and inappropriate use of secrecy that is emphasized.” 17
Sociologists of work have indeed studied that problem, 18 and argued that
keepers of state secrets may have predispositions - because of their
personality, experiences (for example of perceived injustice), or motives not
to obey the law, but the manner in which they interact with organizational
factors (such as culture, norms, procedures, reward system, and attitude
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toward employees) may either “increase or decrease the probability of
deviant behaviours.”19 Espionage, however, is the deviant form of behavior
that has most interested scholars and excited popular writers. 20 But the
means by which foreign nations or other adversaries attempt to obtain state
secrets, and how to defeat them, are well covered by counterintelligence
experts in the field of intelligence studies. 21
Despite the general neglect of social scientists, there is a large but
disparate literature on state secrets. The graphic below (called an NGram)
shows the relative usage frequency from 1800 to 2008 (the latest date that
can be used) of the terms “state secrets” in the millions of printed sources
digitally available to Google (a corpus of books published in English in the
United States).22

Figure 1: NGram for “state secrets”
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Source: Shen et al (2016).23

The NGram clearly shows that the ascendency of the use of the terms
“state secrets” correlates very closely with the advent of the Cold War.
Thompson offers an assessment of this US-centric literature:
Government secrecy certainly has not been ignored. Many
scholars and reformers have examined it critically, and
government bodies have investigated the problem. […]
Nevertheless, most of the literature on government secrecy
neglects the fundamental democratic values underlying the
problem and focuses instead on the laws and policies that
regulate secrecy, patterns of abuses by individual officials, or
particular practices such as executive privilege and national
security.24

What is Secrecy?
Secrecy, of course, “has a life outside of the demands and desires of
the state”25 and that life has been examined as both a normal and deviant
form of personal behavior. This is the world of the intimacy of everyday life,
where emotional, sexual and psychological closeness “has traditionally
desired secrecy: the trustworthiness of friends, the discretion of lovers, the
enshrined secrecy of the confessional, of the doctor’s surgery and the
psychiatrist’s couch.”26 Human beings keep secrets between themselves and
from others as a matter of fact. It is part of their daily routines and, as Joel
Feinberg notes, “life would be hardly tolerable if there were no secrets we
could keep (away from the ‘street’), no preserve of dignity, no guaranteed
solitude.”27 Prominent sociologists like Georg Simmel28 and Irving Goffman29
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and more recently legal scholar William Ian Miller30 indeed all have argued
that most of us intentionally hide or fake things about ourselves in our
everyday lives.31 For Simmel, this secrecy that we exercise is “one of the
greatest accomplishments of humanity.”32 This is the case, he believes,
because without secrecy life would just not be the same as “many sorts of
purposes could never arrive at realization.” 33 Such a sociological interest in
secrecy has obviously “existed for some time, although it could not be said
that the field is at all coherent, or that it constitutes a disciplinary subfield.” 34
Although this observation is apt, I will highlight a few contributions that I
think are interesting and valuable.
In their discussion of capitalism and schizophrenia, philosophers Gilles
Deleuze and Félix Guattari problematize the notion of the secret by asserting
that it must have a content in a form that is covered, isolated or disguised,
given its role to suppress formal relations. 35 For them as well, the secret is in
essence a sociological notion; it is invented and a collective assemblage, and
therefore not a static notion. In fact, how it is perceived can change and
differ from person to person; it secretly influences, spreads and
propagates.36 In short, they write,
the secret, defined as a content that has hidden its form in favor
of a simple container, is inseparable from two movements that
can accidentally interrupt its course or betray it, but are
nonetheless an essential part of it: something must ooze from
the box, something will be perceived though the box or in the
half-opened box.37
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Organizational theorists Jana Costas and Christopher Grey opine in a
similar direction, but in a slightly more nuanced manner:
Secrecy refers to the [social] process of keeping secrets, while
secret refers to the content, the actual ‘things’- more precisely,
the information about ‘things’- that are being intentionally
concealed. […] the keeping of a secret requires continuing
concealment or, alternatively, the breaking of the secret through
revelation. This means that for secrets to exist actors need to
constantly engage in practices of concealment […]. Intentional
concealment is a social phenomenon in that it is carried out by
social actors in concert and is likely to involve a rich array of
symbolic and ritualistic practices whereby, for example, the
signing of a confidentiality agreement or the giving of a promise
(e.g. formally, on oath or, informally, "on my life") are potent
markers of the boundary between being or not being ‘in the
know’. Indeed, secrecy has potential social consequences (upon
those social actors and others) above and beyond the
concealment of information, one example being the possible awe
and mystery that surrounds them (mysterium) but others
include, potentially, shame or guilt or other effects on identity
[…].38
Secrecy, therefore, has more than one function. While in the eyes of
the state it is about the protection of information or material from
unauthorized disclosure for their intrinsic value, for secret keepers it can also
be about their protection from disclosure for symbolic value. 39 Pierre
Bourdieu, a sociologist, notes too that secrecy has a symbolic function: it is
“a rare, scarce resource or valuable commodity, which confers a special kind
of prestige and so determines one’s status within a given hierarchy of
power.”40 So did history professor Janet Brodie, who explains well the
symbolic impact on individuals entrusted with state secrets:
To obtain [a security] clearance carried powerful symbolic
meaning, providing access to arcane knowledge and changing
https://scholarworks.sjsu.edu/secrecyandsociety/vol2/iss2/9
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the way one regarded others and was, in turn, regarded. Once
one obtained access to classified information, those without such
access appeared uninformed, even ignorant. It changed the way
one regarded peers, colleagues, and the scope of intellectual
exchange.41
That secrecy may not encapsulate any valuable state secret, however,
has long been recognized by keepers of state secrets themselves. Worldrenown novelist John Le Carré, who served in British intelligence at the
height of the Cold War, explains the symbolic power that the lure of secrecy
had for him:
[it provided] a means of outgunning people we would otherwise
be scared of; of feeling superior to life rather than engaging in
it; as a place of escape, attracting not the strong in search of
danger, but us timid fellows, who couldn’t cope with reality one
calendar day without the structures of conspiracy to get us by.42
Oxford historians during their Second World War military service made
a similar point. Hugh Trevor-Roper, then serving with fellow historians in the
Radio Security Service, reported in his personal journal words by his
colleague Stuart Hampshire:
Stuart Hampshire observed that S.I.S. [British Secret
Intelligence Service, popularly known as MI6] values information
in proportion to its secrecy, not to its accuracy. They would
attach more value, he said, to a scrap of third-rate and
tendentious misinformation smuggled out of Sofia in the flybuttons of a vagabond Rumanian pimp than to any intelligence
deduced from a prudent reading of the foreign press. And of
course he’s quite right.43
Marxist theorist Guy Debord added to this discussion on the function of
secrecy by arguing that generalized secrecy is a principal feature of the
modern capitalist system, that it stands “behind the spectacle, as the
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decisive complement of all its displays and, in the last analysis, as its most
vital operation.”44 In other words, he noted later, “[o]ur society is built on
secrecy,” with both private sector secrets and state secrets and an increasing
number of people “trained to act in secret.”45 In such a society, “[t]he
spectator is simply supposed to know nothing, and deserve nothing.” 46
Taking the left-wing terrorist threat of the 1980s to illustrate his argument,
he wrote that “[t]he spectators must certainly never know everything about
terrorism, but they must always know enough to convince them that,
compared with terrorism, everything else must be acceptable, or in any case
more rational and democratic.”47 Spectators in fact do accept the existence
of secrecy, that “there are inevitably little areas of secrecy reserved for
specialists.”48 But it would be very difficult for them, in any event, to
determine whether state secrets are legitimate or not:
Unnecessary governmental secrecy remains a pernicious
problem, but it is impossible to prove that point empirically
because of the very nature of secrecy: we do not know what the
government knows and cannot assess whether some of the
information currently out of public view should be disclosed for
the benefit of democratic self-governance.49
Given the foregoing discussion, Simmel was probably correct to say
that:
Secrecy is a universal sociological form, which, as such, has,
nothing to do with the moral valuations of its contents. On the
one hand, secrecy may embrace the highest values […] On the
other hand, secrecy is not in immediate interdependence with
evil, but evil with secrecy. […] Secrecy is, among other things,
also the sociological expression of moral badness. 50
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This observation provides a close linkage to Jody Dean’s argument that
secrecy is inherently something that is political, invoked to “achieve
particular political ends.”51 As an example, she asserts that the way secrecy
was invoked after 9/11 was in terms of a crucial element necessary to save
lives and prevent future occurrences of terrorist acts. It means, in other
words, that “[t]he knowledge contained in the secret is a guarantor of
security.”52 Hence, security would be a byproduct of secrecy. 53 Dean also
observes that the same secrecy prevents public debate while serving as a
source of legitimization to state action. This serves, of course, the ends of
politics, despite the fact that “[p]ublicity is […] a condition for legitimacy
insofar as the secret holds that information decisive for debate.” 54 Joseph
Masco, finally, goes further than Dean by assuming that the ends of politics
also include using secrecy “to create new realities.”55 According to him:
In this post-World War II system, secrecy becomes not just a
technology of state power, a means of orchestrating policy and
protecting state interests through the withholding of information,
but also the basis for an entirely new kind of power: the ability
to create new realities. Specifically, in the nuclear age the idea of
secret knowledge becomes deployable on its own. Evoking the
secret thus becomes a means of claiming greater knowledge,
expertise, and understanding than in fact is possible. 56
The notion of secrecy, overall, is not uniquely tied to the state; it is
indeed an integral part of human behavior which makes it a sociological
notion and phenomenon that is never fixed in time and place. It also has
social consequences that may be highly personal, social or political, and it
performs a number of functions beyond the protection of information or
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material, the symbolic and political ones probably being the most tangible.
This discussion suggests the content of a secret does not matter as much as
the ends to which it is used.
What is a State Secret?
State secrets are information or material that the state is taking
measures to safeguard, deliberately concealing from public view, and
refusing to disclose because it would “be contrary to the best interests of the
state” to do so.57 A state secret is categorized (or classified) as
CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET or TOP SECRET on the basis of the degree of injury
it would cause to a state’s national interest (usually in the areas of national
security, national defense and international relations) if it were disclosed to
anyone not authorized to be in its possession.58 The most guarded state
secrets are usually those that “might reveal what government knows about
terrorists [and spies], or might compromise intelligence sources and
methods, thereby reducing the flow of intelligence [from domestic and
foreign sources]”59 if inappropriately disclosed. Thus, the secrets of subnational governments (i.e., provinces, territories, municipalities), private
sector information of a confidential nature, and information sensitive for
reasons other than the national interest (also known as designated
information) are not state secrets. Cabinet confidences can be classified or
designated sensitive; if classified they constitute state secrets. 60 In the
United States, the deliberative process (as it relates to government decisionhttps://scholarworks.sjsu.edu/secrecyandsociety/vol2/iss2/9
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making) or executive privilege (as it relates to the presidency and its office)
works along similar principles as the Cabinet privilege. 61
The notion of a state secret is intuitively easy to grasp. Like any other
secrets, it has a social existence. However, it also has a formal, legal
existence as it is subject to laws and rules adopted by competent authorities
(government, parliament) that define “what is to be kept secret and how,
who can be entrusted with secrets and what sanctions apply to secrecy
breach.”62 As Kim Lane Scheppele articulated with respect to social secrets, a
state secret can be shallow (a secret that is known publicly to exist, but not
its contents) or deep (a secret that it not publicly known to exist) as well. 63
In their comprehensive definition of secrecy, secret and secrets, Jan
Goldman and Susan Maret also distinguish between various types of secrets,
including core (“in which the compromise of would result in unrecoverable
failure”), essential (denied to adversaries because of their criticality), and
subjective (compact, transparent, arbitrary, changeable, and perishable”)
versus objective (the reverse of subjective).64 These typologies are useful in
discerning the contents and usefulness of secrets, including those of the
state.65
A small number of philosophers, it shall be noted, have indirectly tried
to answer this section’s question for a very long time. In his discussion on
publicity in the context of British parliamentary proceedings, Jeremy
Bentham, who saw secrecy as an instrument of conspiracy and as a
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characteristic of despotic states, made the important point that publicity - a
characteristic of good government under representative democracy - cannot
be an absolute principle and that there were circumstances where it ought to
be suspended in order to prevent an enemy to gain an advantage, “to injure
innocent persons” and “to inflict too severe a punishment upon the guilty.” 66
Thomas Hobbes and Benedict de Spinoza had preceded Bentham in arguing
that state secrecy should only be evoked in exceptional circumstances, and
that it is preferable, in Spinoza’s words, “for the honest policies of a state to
be obvious to its enemies than for the guilty secrets of tyrants to be kept
hidden from its citizens.”67 Governing in secrecy, Spinoza added, would be
“supreme folly”: the populace would “judge ill of the same” and give
“everything an unfavourable interpretation.” 68 Hobbes, familiar with the
notion of arcana imperii (variably translated as invisible power, secret
government or secrets of statecraft), thought that publicity was essential on
the part of the sovereign to avoid the people being ignorant or misinformed,
but that truth should not be exaggerated so as to preserve peace and
stability.69 Philosopher John Stuart Mill shared the views of Spinoza and
Bentham, adding that the public and open discussion of ideas was essential
for arriving at the truth.70
Complexifying the issue considerably, critical theorist Mark Neocleous
more recently argued that the creation and keeping of state secrets has
much to do with the material nature of state power than with anything

https://scholarworks.sjsu.edu/secrecyandsociety/vol2/iss2/9
DOI: 10.31979/2377-6188.2021.020209

16

Lefebvre: State Secrecy: A Literature Review

else.71 It is about the idea of the state as a possessor of knowledge - a
gatherer “of all necessary information, both overt and secret, that
government needs to fashion its policies and do its work” 72 and which it
seeks to protect from unauthorized disclosure - that has its own interests to
pursue (reason of state), making secrecy a necessary feature or ritual of
state power over the last 500 years.73 Eliminating state secrecy therefore
makes no sense unless the state itself no longer makes any sense. 74 This
speaks again to the function of secrecy, raised in the preceding section. This
observation also is reflective of the linkages between state secrecy and
bureaucracies made by a number of preeminent theorists.
Sociologist Max Weber famously linked the existence of modern state
secrets to the bureaucracy of the state:
secrecy is used to sustain the power interests of the
bureaucracy. Indeed, the term “official secret” is an invention of
the bureaucracy. And nothing is more fanatically protected by
bureaucracy than the concept that secrecy is necessary, an
attitude which is not objectively warranted outside those specific
areas discussed above [e.g., diplomacy, military
administration].75
Particularly interested in German politics, Weber argued that the ability
of the German parliament at the turn of the 19th Century to control the
administration of the state was impeded by parliament’s ignorance of state
activities, which he attributed “to the fact that officialdom’s most important
instrument of power is the transformation of official information into secret
information by means of the infamous concept of ‘official secrecy’, which
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ultimately is merely a device to protect the administration from control.”76
The official [state] secret, from that standpoint, is thus nothing less than a
specific invention of the bureaucracy that serves its pure interest. 77 This
notion of bureaucratic self-interest suggests that keepers of state secrets
would recognize that interest and hence not disclose secrets without
authorization because doing so would be against their self-interest. Weber
however conceded that in some cases secrecy can be justified:
As long as competing industries exist, especially competition
between different countries, it will be essential to protect at least
their technical operations secrets adequately against tendentious
publication, and, even more importantly, secrets of a militarytechnical nature. Finally this must also apply to foreign policy
deliberations which are still in the balance.78 [so as not to
endanger or prevent peace].79
Weber’s thinking was present in the impactful report of the
Commission on Protecting and Reducing Government Secrecy. Established by
the US Congress in 1994 and chaired by Daniel Patrick Moynihan, the
Commission described the US secrecy system as a regulatory scheme with
costs and benefits in need of greater accountability and input from
Congress.80
Marxists for their part have doggedly pointed out that state or
administrative secrecy is a necessary concealment mechanism that the
capitalist state uses to give legitimacy to an exploitative accumulation
process.81 Karl Marx made the simple but still powerful point that the control

https://scholarworks.sjsu.edu/secrecyandsociety/vol2/iss2/9
DOI: 10.31979/2377-6188.2021.020209

18

Lefebvre: State Secrecy: A Literature Review

of knowledge, and therefore secrecy, was a fundamental characteristic of the
bureaucracy.82
Notwithstanding its ideological flavour, Marx’s original point has a lot of
currency today. In fact, even non-Marxists can appreciate that secrecy is a
bureaucratic characteristic that has become “the reigning force in
governments around the world - both elected and non-elected.”83 The
reasons for that, of course, extend beyond supporting the capitalist mode of
production. As Peters succinctly notes:
[s]ecrecy has been adopted quite simply to ensure that
administrators as public servants will be isolated from shortterm political pressures and be free to make decisions in what
they consider to be the ‘public interest.84
Secrecy, the argument further goes, allows bureaucracies to be
neutral, and more effective and autonomous than if they were operating with
a high degree of transparency.85 In a context where their advice is
privileged, bureaucrats are more likely to express themselves freely and
frankly with both their subordinates, colleagues and superiors: “unless such
an exchange of ideas, trying out of proposals, and general brainstorming is
kept confidential, the whole process of reaching a reasoned decision is
acutely impeded.”86 Moreover, as Michael Reed points out, official secrecy has
allowed bureaucrats to monopolize knowledge and expertise in the
protection of their own interests and to become “an independent social and
political force within modern capitalist political economies and societies.” 87
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With the advent of the Cold War, the production and protection of state
secrets by democratic polities have become increasingly normalized, with the
consequence that national security decisions and activities are increasingly
invisible to the public. In an important article in 2008, criminologist Willem
de Lint analyzes the normalization of security and intelligence - and by direct
implications secrecy - in democratic polities. He argues that the intelligence
function of the state is increasingly being used within security politics, with
the consequence that exclusions and exceptions are becoming a normal
course of business, and the basis for decisions that must remain discreet
(the use of secret intelligence information in immigration cases in Canada
and the United States is a case in point). This is especially becoming
apparent in the realm of administrative law88 and, in Canada, criminal law.89
The problem with a security apparatus that has become
“intelligencified,” de Lint writes, is that it “produces an intelligence antipolitics in which a cloaked knowledge justifies, penetrates, and at strategic
moments overturns popular and state sovereignty.”90 He recognizes the
system of exclusion famously expressed by Foucault 91 that the
“intelligencified” practice of knowledge generates, and notes quite rightly
that as a system of knowledge intelligence is subject to entry controls, and
the use of its data subject to hierarchical filtering (security clearances, trust
networks, loyalty measures, etc.) to ensure that there is no unauthorized
disclosure.92 The key point here is that the exclusion of blanket categories of
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individuals (e.g., homosexuals, communists, gamblers, etc.) from
government service in the past was seen as a necessary measure to take to
protect state secrecy and a state’s national security. 93
To his process of “intelligentified” governance, de Lint associates
rationalities/discourses that conceptualize state secrecy in a particular way
both for popular consumption and for those who must protect secrets. A
number of them come immediately to mind: the accelerating shift from a
post-crime to a pre-crime society in the pursuit of security (with its heavy
emphasis on intelligence gathering and the exchange of intelligence across
national boundaries, both done with the utmost degree of secrecy 94 as de
Lint argues), the advent of the risk society, 95 and a renewed emphasis on the
use of state coercion by liberal polities (which de Lint refers to as “sovereign
and coercive rationalities and techniques […] within the very territory of the
liberal art of government,”96 for example, the Canadian Conservative
government’s “tough on crime” agenda from 2010 to 2015). Keepers of state
secrets exposed to these rationalities and with responsibilities to act
according to them can be convinced that the protection of state secrets is
essential, that not protecting state secrets would increase risks, and that it
would reduce the ability of the state to prevent crimes and use coercion
efficiently.
The knowledge that makes secrecy so pervasive in national security
matters is expressed by national security experts and government lawyers,
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to whom judges usually show a high degree of deference, 97 and whose
security discourse, to borrow from de Lint and Sirpa Virta, “is conceptualized
in ways which privilege finitude, certainty, realism and executive authority so
that potentially endless ambiguities may be cut short. Security talk offers a
variety of closures when exercised to privilege the dominant discourse.” 98 As
Bourdieu aptly observed, it is only the state and its representatives that are
in a position to create an official viewpoint that must be recognized by the
court.99
While the existence of state secrets is undisputed because they are
subject to laws and rules adopted by competent authorities, their meaning
is. State secrets can be known and identified once they have been officially
disclosed or leaked. Many scholars, however, argue their very existence
depends on function, not content; they would not exist without serving a
particular purpose. That purpose is a matter of debate and, as de Lint
argues, shifting. In that sense, what a state secret is cannot easily be
disassociated from one’s understanding of the notion of secrecy.
Which State Secrets Deserve Protection from Disclosures?
The foregoing discussion has partly answered that question. Here, I
only intend to supplement this discussion with additional scholarly
observations. I do so to highlight the fact that secret keepers are not the
only ones to offer reasons to protect state secrets from disclosure.

https://scholarworks.sjsu.edu/secrecyandsociety/vol2/iss2/9
DOI: 10.31979/2377-6188.2021.020209

22

Lefebvre: State Secrecy: A Literature Review

In studying the underlying structure of social institutions, Scheppele
recognizes that the state can make special claims (e.g., defence and national
security claims), and that it “presents a special case” that “deserves special
and separate treatment.”100 This view is supported by the work of Amy
Gutmann and Dennis Thompson, who also make the point that there could
be exceptional reasons for the presumption of publicity for politically relevant
information to be rebutted by the claims of secrecy.
They contend that there are three principal reason: necessity, liberty
and opportunity and deliberation.101 The first reason is that secrecy is
necessary if making its contents public would defeat its purpose. 102 In such
few cases, secret keepers would be expected to “give an account of the
reasons for the secrets, and respond to demands to limit their scope.” 103 The
second reason is that unrestrained publicity may negatively affect basic
liberty and opportunity, for example when the release of specific and
identifiable information violate the personal integrity of officials and
citizens.104 The third reason is that secrecy sometimes better supports
democratic deliberation than not, as long as prospective and retrospective
accountability is present.105 In that context, deceptive secrets (concealing
information to deceive other people), except perhaps in wartime or against
criminals, would hardly ever be justifiable because they could not logically be
open to prospective accountability. Often, they are those secrets that hide
wrongdoing or questionable policies the state believes are right. 106 Deep
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secrets, which can also be deceptive in nature, are similarly problematic, as
only shallow secrets can be challenged. 107
David Pozen, for his part, has outlined the various consequentialist
arguments in support of “state” secrecy in a small number of categories.
First, secrecy is necessary to prevent adversaries (like spies, terrorists or
criminals) from using disclosed secrets in a manner that would harm national
interests or negate the effectiveness of the state in the implementation of its
policies. That argument speaks directly to the preservation of the state itself
(including “acting quickly and decisively against threats, protecting sources
and methods of intelligence gathering, and investigating and enforcing the
law against violators).”108 Second, secrecy may be necessary to permit frank
and free “governmental deliberations and decision making,” 109 although, I
would note, none of these deliberations, if known publicly, would necessarily
amount to a state secret. Third, secrecy may be necessary to protect
individual privacy or other associated values, which again do not necessarily
involve state secrets. Finally, to keep things secret is seemingly cheaper than
developing an administrative structure to promote and enact transparency
policies.110
Taking this issue from a very different perspective, philosopher
Bernard Williams mused that
If the right to spy [by the state] is granted at all, then the right
to know must be suspended; or if it is insisted upon, then it
queries must be met with lies. Espionage, one must
tautologously insist, is supposed to be covert. There are indeed
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questions [...] about what sort of activity espionage is; what role
it plays in national security; and what sorts of games, in the
name of national security, are played between nations. But one
thing that is clear is that so long as there are such activities, the
more the right to know is insisted upon, the thicker the web of
even domestic deceit must become.111
He is, of course, very perceptive.
Here, it would be fair to suggest that scholars have not spent a large
amount of time and effort identifying and analyzing the sets of reasons that
secret keepers or judges rely on not to disclose state secrets. While they
have had no difficulty recognizing that state secrets can be considered
legitimate, essentially pointing at consequentialist arguments, they have
described and developed these arguments cursorily; there is no sense in
their writings that these arguments are cogently connected to one another
or that they form a coherent discourse reproduced by the community of
secret keepers and judges.
How are State Secrets Protected from Disclosure?
Where the study of secrecy has particularly not been neglected, as I
have noted above, is in its breach. Simmel captures very well why secrecy
pledges are transgressed:
the possibility and the temptation of treachery plays around the
secret, and the external danger of being discovered is
interwoven with the internal danger of self-discovery, which has
the fascination of the brink of a precipice. Secrecy sets barriers
between men, but at the same time offers the seductive
temptation to break through the barriers by gossip or confession.
This temptation accompanies the psychical life of the secret like
an overtone. Hence the sociological significance of the secret, its
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practical measure, and the mode of its workings must be found
in the capacity or the inclination of the initiated to keep the
secret to himself, or in his resistance or weakness relative to the
temptation to betrayal.112
Accepting that state secrecy is bound to be violated, but that perhaps
the initiated can resist temptation, suggests that criminology, sociology or
law may have something to say about crimes related to the unauthorized
disclosure of state secrets. Sébastien-Yves Laurent has shown in his review
of the criminology literature that it does not have much to say on this, 113 at
least directly. The literature on sociology is in a similar situation. Just like
criminology, it offers ideas, concepts and mechanisms (e.g., deterrence,
social control, physical and socio-cultural restraints, habits, norms) to
account for conformity and compliance, and these would be relevant to help
explain why so many secret keepers abide by their oath of secrecy.
Essentially, the state relies on a broad assemblage of disciplinary and
normalizing techniques (“heterogeneous, linked set of processes and
techniques that seek to harness the raw power of information” 114) to ensure
that secret keepers abide by the law. Stanton Tefft summarizes them well:
These include secrecy classifications, screening and security
clearances for potential employees, indoctrination, oaths of
loyalty (sometimes), severe penalties for unauthorized
disclosures, and continued surveillance of employees once hired
(“aftercare”). Within the executive leadership only the most
trusted officials may be privy to the totality of some secret plans
or activities, while others know only small details rather than the
whole picture. Still others gain access to certain details on a
need-to-know basis.115
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More specifically, secret keepers, in addition to acting lawfully, are
expected to behave in accordance with a normative code of ethics, and to
abide by the duty of loyalty they owe to the Constitution and their employer
(the state and not an individual officeholder). The internalization of these
values act as a form of self-regulation that may be important. The former
director of the United Kingdom’s Government Communications
Headquarters, Sir David Omand, writes that:
self-regulation is the most important form of regulation […] You
can have all the rules and all the oversight, but when they are
out of your sight, you have to rely on the fact that [your staff]
have internalised a code of values.116
Greg Thielmann, who served with the Bureau of Intelligence and
Research at the State Department, gives support to this view when he writes
that:
As a 25-year veteran of the US Foreign Service, I was not a
stranger to encounters with the public and with the press, but
most of my work during those years was in the classified realm
and most of my advice and analysis was for official consumption
only. I had internalized a professional code of conduct designed
to protect the sources and methods used to acquire intelligence
secrets and to encourage frank and open policy deliberations
inside government. I was concerned about inadvertently
stepping over the line in discussing subjects dealing with
classified information.117
But as Michael Waller and Andrew Linkater observe: “The idea that
loyalty arises purely from sentiment, from a ‘we-feeling’ entirely independent
of any manipulation or manufacturing, is surely naïve. 118 So the state goes to
great length to intimately know its secret keepers’ past, associations to
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others (for example, criminals, antisocial individuals, foreign state actors…),
and risk factors (for example, educational and employment failure, a
criminal history, substance abuse…) in order to assess their future behavior.
They accumulate that knowledge through extensive and detailed background
or vetting investigations (the more intrusive the more sensitive the secrets
to be accessed by a secret keeper are). But background investigations have
not always been good indicators of future behaviors:
the effort is […] to formulate a judgment about the degree of
possibility that an event will occur in the future. The extent of
the risk that a particular individual will be faithless is not subject
to conclusive demonstration. A judgment concerning it involves
hypotheses, impressions, experiences, and generalized
prejudices (favorable or unfavorable to the applicant), which are
brought to bear consciously or, often, unconsciously. 119
Therefore, other mechanisms are also relied upon to ensure that
secret keepers to do not disclose any state secrets without authorization.
The first mechanism is about indoctrination and training. The benefits of
properly training individuals were well captured centuries ago. James
Urmson, in his interpretation of Aristotle’s ethics, writes that:
If properly trained one comes to enjoy doing things the right
way, to want to do things the right way, and to be distressed by
doing things wrongly. […] Aristotle compares acquiring a good
character with acquiring a skill. […] Before one has acquired the
art or skill one acts in accordance with the instructions of a
teacher, who tells us what to do, and one does it with effort.
Gradually, by practice and repetition, it becomes effortless and
second nature.120
Indoctrination, on the other hand, is more subtle. It involves things
like rituals of initiation to a profession, the acquisition of a unique
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professional language, and processes of socialization and resocialization to
classified environments. Jon Wiant discusses the first two mechanisms as
follow:
Rituals of initiation: Institutional or “tribal” boundaries are
maintained by the requirements of entry rituals, e.g.
examinations, special screenings, polygraph, etc. The badges of
the Community symbolically reaffirm the importance of the
initiation ritual. […] The more sensitive the collection
sources/methods the more likely the organization involved takes
on the attributes of a secret society or rigorously clan like
organization. There is limited mobility between such clans and
they all tend to develop unique professional language that
requires some simultaneous translation at the boundaries. 121
Former CIA intelligence analyst Aki Peritz explains at length how the
socialization and resocialization processes work:
[CIA employees are] constantly reminded of the oath already.
CIA employees are already acutely aware of what happens when
you disclose classified material. From the first day a new agency
trainee, analyst, or administrative staff member enters CIA
Headquarters and ‘takes the oath’ to uphold and protect the US
Constitution, they are told in no uncertain terms the very ugly,
life destroying consequences of betraying privileged information.
As a former analyst, I remember the gruff, mustachioed fellow
from the Office of Security who, on the first day of my
employment, made this point crystal clear.
This emphasis is underscored in multiple training classes. For
example, every new analyst must attend the Career Analyst
Program (CAP), where grizzled intelligence vets teach ‘the basic
thinking, writing, and briefing skills needed for a successful
career.’ One point that gets hammered home is what happens to
people who provide information to those who shouldn't have it
especially foreign governments. These classes highlight, among
other cases, the Aldrich Ames and Robert Hanssen affairs, and
take care to emphasize that these former top officials are
currently serving life sentences in prison.
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It’s the Agency Culture. CIA employees are reminded in ways
both large and small about the consequences of mishandling or
misusing classified documents. Your colleagues remind you. Your
managers remind you. The internal websites remind you. When
someone is caught providing secrets, even the director reminds
you.
Furthermore, because of their chosen careers, CIA employees
are made justifiably paranoid about ‘security violations’ for
instance, if you absent mindedly took a classified document from
your office, placed it in your briefcase or purse, exited the
building, and then remembered you had it while walking to your
car, the Office of Security could slap you with a security violation.
(Pro tip: Don't take a suitcase or large purse to work.) 122
These mechanisms can be very effective. Memoirs of former
intelligence professionals often reflect on that point:
Miles Copeland: “The most impressive part of this initial CIA
indoctrination is the attitude toward loyalty, security, precision,
attention to detail, and healthy suspicion that it manages to implant in
the minds of the trainee. ‘Because of my indoctrination,’ writes Patrick
McGarvey in his CIA: The Myth and the Madness, ‘I still get a visceral
twinge - and have qualms of conscience about writing this book.’
Although one cannot detect any signs of reticence in Pat McGarvey’s
book, I know what he means. The fact is that this aspect of the
indoctrination has been designed by some of the nation’s best
psychologists, employing the most modern techniques of ‘motivational
research.’ Certainly it achieves its purpose… Also, the psychologists
believe their course imparts a strong sense of mission, which is lacking
in other branches of government.123
Gail Donnalley: “This legal requirement [to protect intelligence
sources and methods] is consciously and unconsciously instilled in
each employee of the Central Intelligence Agency every day of his
employment. For those of us who have been with the Agency for some
time, protection of sources and methods has thus become instinctive.
We have been trained to err on the side of caution, because a mistake
the other way could have dire effects.”124
Tyler Drumheller: “We had it drummed into us for so long: don’t
wave any red flags, don’t talk about this or that, don’t stand out. So
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you grow distant from your wider family and friends and grow closer to
your agency friends.”125
In spite of these and other similar testimonials, the state yet goes
further in ensuring that its secrets remain under wrap. As Seumas Miller
explains, values, indoctrination and training are not sufficient in and of
themselves:
From the fact that individual persons are inducted into a
particular framework of conventions, social norms, institutions,
and other social forms, and therefore exhibit the characteristic
features and orientations of members of the social group in
question, it does not follow that those individuals are not morally
autonomous agents or that they are to any significant extent
coerced. [...] it is a matter for empirical investigation whether
some value has been imposed on a particular individual, or
individuals, or not.126
The state therefore has another suite of mechanisms to minimize the
risk of unauthorized disclosure. The first is establishment of need-to-know
controls. Judge Richard Posner correctly explains the rationale for such
controls:
It’s […] a mistake to think that simple possession of a security
clearance automatically entitles its possessor to access to
classified information that he is cleared to see. (The levels of
classification differ; someone cleared for Secret information is
not entitled to access to Top Secret information.) There are too
many leaks of classified information—too much carelessness and
irresponsibility in the handling of such information—to allow
automatic access to holders of the applicable security clearances.
[…] So in addition to having the requisite clearance the seeker
must convince the holder of the information of the seeker’s need
to know it.127
If no one knows too much, then the damages resulting from
unauthorized disclosures can be minimized, so the logic goes. To ensure that
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no one knows more than strictly necessary to carry out one’s duties,
classified information is compartmentalized, that is, it is sliced “into parts so
no one individual can put the secrets together to comprehend a ‘bigger
picture.’”128 Such compartmentalization has the added advantage of making
a secret keeper “a less savory target for those who seek to know the full
picture.”129 Memoirs of former intelligence officers discuss this process in
some details. For example, Ralph Bennet, a direct participant in this process
at the United Kingdom’s Government Code and Cipher School during World
War II, recalls,
[…] there was the necessary restriction imposed by our own
security regulations upon the use of Ultra [German intercepted
communications]. The number of those allowed to know about it
was strictly limited both at home and in the field. Commanders
were strictly forbidden to order any action which might imperil
the source by seeming to be ascribable only to the reading of
Enigma traffic–[…] unless it was diluted from less secret sources,
the consequences might be disastrous–it might be compromised
and so lost for the future. […] The number of those in the secret
was kept to the minimum compatible with effective use.130
Compartmentalization, however, has disadvantages. As Walter
Gellhorn explains:
The inefficiency of compartmentalization of work–or, more
accurately, fragmentation of knowledge–is threefold. First,
fragmentation so narrows the range of expertness that effective
utilization of scientifically trained manpower is badly hampered.
[…] Second, compartmentalization prevents full utilization of
work that has already been successfully accomplished. […] Third,
compartmentalization necessitates frequent duplication of
unfruitful research.131
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The second mechanism requires secret keepers to accept prior
restraint and to sign nondisclosure agreements. As Jack Balkin explains:
A prior restraint is a licensing system, in which a censor (either
the state or a private party) decides whether speech will be
permitted at all. Subsequent punishment is a system of
prosecutorial discretion, in which the state or a private plaintiff
decides whether it is worth undertaking the costs of prosecution
or litigation. Systems of prior restraint create bottlenecks with
fewer procedural protections. They place the burden on the
speaker to gain permission, and therefore the power of inertia
rests with the censor, who may delay or simply decide against
publication as a matter of administrative convenience. Having to
ask permission alerts the censor to what is being published and
establishes the idea of censorship as a norm. Moreover, if a
speaker does not seek permission or tries to route around the
system, retribution is likely because the speaker has specifically
defied the authority of the censor.
132

In the United States, federal employees are bound to secrecy for life
by agreeing never to divulge classified information without explicit
authorization from the executive branch.133 Before being granted access to
classified information, President Reagan, in his National Security Decision
Directive 84 of 11 March 1983, further required federal employees to sign a
nondisclosure agreement that would be binding and enforceable through
disciplinary measures or in a civil action.134 For those employees having
access to Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI), in particular all
employees of the Central Intelligence Agency, the additional obligation,
during the course of employment and thereafter, to submit to the employing
department all information and material, including work of fiction, intended
for publication, was imposed.135

Published by SJSU ScholarWorks, 2021

33

Secrecy and Society, Vol. 2, No. 2 [2021], Art. 9

Veteran CIA officers are conscious of this obligation. Gary Schroen
writes that:
One of the challenges facing every CIA officer who sits down to
write anything for publication, regardless of the format or length,
is the requirement to protect the secrecy of CIA sources and
methods. This responsibility is spelled out in a formal secrecy
agreement that each CIA officer signs as part of his initial
employment processing. The agreement also includes a
requirement that any and all materials written for publication
must be submitted to the CIA’s Publication Review Board (PRB),
with the aim of editing out any classified information or any
sensitive operational details that might jeopardize methods used
in the field, identify specific foreign nationals serving as sources
for the CIA, or identify CIA officers serving undercover. 136
The third mechanism is the conduct of regular polygraph examinations
throughout the career of those collecting and accessing the most sensitive
information. These examinations have a long history in the United States
(the CIA, for example, started using the polygraph for the screening of
potential employees as early as 1947).137 The objective of these
examinations is primarily to act as deterrent by ensuring commitment to
one’s obligations.138 A young US military intelligence soldier tells of her
polygraph experience as follow:
I sit in the polygraph chair before training can start, heart
pounding as I’m strapped, fingers and heart, to a machine that
reads my every flutter and gasp. Top-secret starts here, with
these last few tests, to make sure I’m not a traitor or a liar. And
when I pass, when this next level of training starts, I learn there
is a sequester of knowledge.139
Former CIA covert case officer Valeri Plame Wilson, upon the start of
yet another polygraph examination, approached it as follow:
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Although my initial poly had not been painful, it is an experience
that no one ever likes. This time, however, I approached the
dreaded exam armed with a colleague’s advice: treat it like a
Catholic confession. That is, tell the examiner absolutely
everything, every excruciating detail that you think might have
relevance to the question posed. At a minimum, you’ll bore the
polygrapher to tears. I used this tactic, dredging up every
possible incident that might negatively affect my responses and
it worked like a charm; I was in and out of the claustrophobic
exam room in a record three hours.140
The polygraph too, however, is not infallible. As neuroscientist James
Fallon notes,
Most people with a conscience have tells that betray their
thoughts and emotions. That’s why most people are poor poker
players. But psychopaths are masters at hiding their true
intentions. One of their disarming but pernicious attributes is
their ability to remain cool when they lie. […] psychopaths can
dream up fantastic lies and never show any sign of guilt or
remorse. Some psychopaths [however] do respond emotionally,
as measured by heart rate and galvanic skin response […]. 141
Additional mechanisms are therefore applied, including a wide range of
measures affecting situational factors. In criminology, Situational Crime
Prevention (SCP) is an approach that seek to to minimize the risk of
occurrence and the seriousness of a crime142 by increasing the effort required
to commit a crime, increasing the risks for a potential offender, reducing the
reward derived from crime, reducing provocation and removing excuses for
committing a crime.143 In the context of state secrecy, this means specific
protection measures to avoid the unauthorized access to secrets and the
detection of inappropriate use of secrets including special physical standards,
the use of Secure Compartmentalized Information Facilities (SCIF), biometric
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identifiers, the prohibition of personal electronic devices where secrets can
be assessed, the physical surveillance of premises where secrets are located,
the constant monitoring of computer use, and random physical personal
searches on work premises. As the young US military intelligence soldier
quoted above observed:
I now exist in places carefully monitored and structured for
security, enclosed rooms with no windows, no cell phones or
internet, these Sensitive Compartmented Information Facilities
where anything can be said and everywhere else outside these
doors is profane.144
As no single mechanism is sufficient to protect state secrets from
unauthorized disclosure, the state relies instead on a broad assemblage of
disciplinary and normalizing techniques, which together significantly
minimize the risks of disclosures. Trust in this context is the last line of
defense:
It is […] important to note that while all of our capabilities can
reduce the likelihood and impact of unauthorized disclosures, in
the final analysis our system is based on trust—trust in the
individuals who have access to classified information and trust
that they will be responsible stewards of this Nation’s most
sensitive information.145
Conclusion
This literature overview has shown that secrecy is pervasive in society
and constitutive of the material nature of state power. In a post-9/11
context, claims of state secrecy have been increasingly normalized. A secret,
it has been shown, is more than information or material that the state is
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taking measures to safeguard because of consequentialist reasons. It is also
a social construct. Its very content (whether it has any value) is covered,
isolated or disguised through symbolic and ritualistic practices, without which
there would be no revelation possible. 146 It has a political life as much as it
affects individual and group identities because of its symbolic value. But it
also has a formal, legal existence as it is subject to laws adopted by
competent authorities.
These laws and rules make it a crime to disclose a state secret without
authorization. To prevent such disclosure, the law, including the harsh law of
treason, supposedly serves as a deterrent. However, as deterrence does not
always work, the law is supplemented by a series of social and physical
controls to reduce the temptation and the very possibility of secret keepers
transgressing the law. The law, in legal proceedings, allows the state to refer
to provisions and procedures that, when correctly applied, protect state
secrets from legal disclosure.
The literature on state secrecy, to the extent one can be identified, is
disparate, largely US-centric, but also multidisciplinary, and on the
ascendency. As many of the questions surrounding social and state secrecy
have been answered in many different ways by a plurality of scholars, there
is a question that is calling for answers just as secrecy is being normalized:
What sets of reasons or rationalities do secret keepers and the law use to
justify the nondisclosure of state secrets? The legal environment is a prime
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site for such an investigation because it is there that these reasons are best
articulated, either in written documents or in oral arguments. The gap in the
literature on state secrecy is about what is said on why state secrets deserve
protection from disclosure, by whom, and with what effect. This is ultimately
about how the discourses of secret keepers and the law legitimize the
existence of state secrets. Without knowing how state secrecy claims are
justified through discourse, a discourse of resistance cannot be properly
articulated and deployed and the current construct of state secrecy changed.
De Lint and Pozen, with his consequentialist arguments, have started the
analysis, but it remains limited to a number of paragraphs. The time is ripe
to move the literature forward in a way that will contribute and complement
its development a developing literature at a time of abundant state
secrets.147
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